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AIM consists of:
■ Over 250 AIM Fellows and Scholars – all leading academics in their fields…
■ Working in cooperation with leading international academics and specialists
as well as UK policymakers and business leaders…
■ Undertaking a wide range of collaborative research projects on management…
■ Disseminating ideas and shared learning through publications, reports, 
workshops and events…
■ Fostering new ways of working more effectively with managers and policymakers…
■ To enhance UK competitiveness and productivity.
AIM’s Objectives
Our mission is to significantly increase the contribution of and future capacity 
for world class UK management research.
Our more specific objectives are to:
■ Conduct research that will identify actions to enhance the UK’s international
competitiveness
■ Raise the quality and international standing of UK research on management 
■ Expand the size and capacity of the active UK research base on management
■ Engage with practitioners and other users of research within and beyond the
UK as co-producers of knowledge about management
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AIM research themes
Current AIM research projects focus on:
UK productivity and performance for the 21st century.
How can UK policymakers evaluate and address concerns surrounding the UK’s
performance in relation to other countries? 
National productivity has been the concern of economists, government policymakers,
and corporate decision-makers for some time. Further research by scholars from a
range of disciplines is bringing new voices to the debates about how the productivity
gap can be measured, and what the UK can do to improve the effectiveness of UK
industry and its supporting public services.
Sustaining innovation to achieve competitive advantage 
and high quality public services.
How can UK managers capture the benefits of innovation while meeting other
demands of a competitive and social environment? 
Innovation is a key source of competitive advantage and public value through new
strategies, products, services and organisational processes. The UK has outstanding
exemplars of innovative private and public sector organisations and is investing
significantly in its science and skills base to underpin future innovative capacity.
Adapting promising practices to enhance performance 
across varied organisational contexts.
How can UK managers disseminate their experience whilst learning from others?
Improved management practices are identified as important for enhancing
productivity and performance. The main focus is on how evidence behind good or
promising practices can be systematically assessed, creatively adapted, successfully
implemented and knowledge diffused to other organisations that will benefit.
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executive summary
Our research reveals that organisations, here in the UK and elsewhere, must face up 
to the complex challenges associated with exploring and developing radical ideas and
innovations if they are to continue to be successful in the long term.  
■ Discontinuous innovation – ‘doing something different’ innovation – is often the
driver of sustained competitive advantage and shareholder value creation. As such
the ability to support radical innovation is an essential organisational competence.
■ The decision-making process in which resources are allocated to innovation
projects is extremely challenging, as the degree of uncertainty involved means 
that using conventional systems and processes often leads to radical ideas being
rejected.    
■ The research identifies twelve excuses that organisations use to justify their
decision not to pursue radical innovation. Organisations must learn to recognise
when they are making these excuses and find other ways of evaluating how to
behave when faced with radical innovation.
■ The innovation selection environment that operates in organisations can be
described in terms of four zones. In two of those zones, new strategies are
required for innovation selection decision-making.
■ There are a number of promising strategies that can help organisations to back 
an innovation winner. These include: building alternative visions; bridge-building
to/from outside the box; probe and learn method; using alternative evaluation and
measurement criteria; mobilising sponsorship and championship; using alternative
decision-making pathways; deploying alternative funding structures; using
alternative – dedicated/devolved/decentralised – implementation structures;
mobilising entrepreneurship inside and outside the firm.
■ Through a thorough understanding of the innovation selection process,
organisations can avoid the pitfalls that lead to abandoning potentially market-
winning radical ideas. At the same time they can learn how to implement strategies
that nurture and develop that all-important discontinuous innovation.  
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Innovation is an organisational imperative. Despite the many interesting and
challenging possibilities for change, however, the realities of resource commitment –
where pursuing one avenue often closes another – mean that organisations cannot
afford to innovate at random. Instead a framework is required allowing an organisation
to map out the role it believes innovation can play in helping the organisation to
survive and grow, and in doing so provide a means by which the allocation of scarce
resources to a portfolio of innovation projects may be assessed.
In a complex and uncertain world, such a strategic framework for innovation should 
be flexible enough to help monitor and adapt projects over time as ideas move towards
more concrete solutions, but rigid enough to justify continuation or termination of a
project as uncertainties and risky guesswork become replaced by actual knowledge.
A further complication is that, by its very nature, innovation decision-making involves
dealing with uncertain outcomes. No one knows if innovations will work. The only
route to greater certainty is through starting a project and then monitoring outcomes,
all the while making further resource allocation decisions based on calculating the
risks associated with different options as best as possible.
introduction: the innovation decision-making challenge 
Not all innovation decision-making is equal, either. With incremental innovation, 
where firms make small and gradual improvements, decision-making can be based 
on well-established existing experience. With more radical innovation, however,
circumstances and risk are so far beyond a firm’s normal parameters for innovation
decision-making that the firm faces a significant challenge in allocating resources
appropriately.
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7The Discontinuous Innovation Laboratory
The Discontinuous Innovation Laboratory (DILab) was originally established in the 
UK in 2005 as an experience-sharing forum for companies and academic researchers
interested in exploring the new and revised management capabilities needed to deal
with innovation ‘beyond the steady state’. From the original network of 30 companies
and five researchers, the network has grown to include 12 countries, around 150
companies and 35 academic institutions. (See www.innovation-lab.org for more
information.)
In operation the underlying metaphor of a laboratory is important – the core format
involves workshops at which experiences are shared and approaches explored and
diffused. In between these meetings (which take place on a quarterly basis) there is
extensive case study/interview based research using a common research framework.
The purpose has been to identify not only core themes and practices but explore 
the variety in their application under a number of different sectoral and operating
contingencies.
Discontinuous Innovation: A definition
Discontinuous innovation: involves a fundamental change in the approach or
technology. Every now and then a disruptive event occurs that changes markets,
industries, and even societies. A good example is the advent of the internet. Such
world changing events give rise to a wave of discontinuous innovation across many
industries. This has a destabilising – or disruptive – effect for established firms.
(Together with management innovation, discontinuous innovation constitutes higher
order innovation, which can be a source of lasting competitive advantage.)
8(1) A different approach
Meeting the innovation decision-making challenge requires understanding and finding
ways to view the world in new ways – reframing. Both individuals and organisations,
through collections of individuals, are unable to process all the information available 
to them in order to understand the world they operate in. Instead they cope by
constructing simplifying frameworks – mental models – with which to make sense 
of the world.
One problem dealing with discontinuous innovation is that we do not possess the
mental models with which to deal with such radical innovation, and so we tend to try
to force such innovation to fit existing models. This process is made easier as the
early external signals of radical innovation are often very weak, allowing interpretation
within established frameworks to persist for some time. By the time the implications
of the radical innovation become very apparent it is often too late for the organisation.
Polaroid was once one of the world’s most innovative businesses – a technologically
successful company that created and led the market for instant photography. 
Yet almost overnight the shutters snapped shut on Polaroid for the last time as it
dissolved into Chapter 11 bankruptcy at the turn of the 21st century. But it wasn’t
because the company failed to see digital imaging coming; the firm was aware of the
technology and had a number of patents in the area. The problem with Polaroid was
that its management was to reframe its business model to take advantage of the 
new conditions.
Organisations need to get to grips with the problem of reframing as it provides some
useful clues on developing alternative routines to support decision-making relating to
resource allocation selection for highly uncertain innovation projects.
Using the kind of rationale methods which work well for incremental innovation is 
likely to be ineffective because of the high uncertainty associated with radical
innovation. The high degree of uncertainty makes it difficult to assemble facts to build a
clear business case, whilst the inertia of the existing framework allows people to make
justifiable rejection arguments of the kind highlighted in the twelve excuses table. 
The problem is complicated by the potential for radical innovation options to conflict
with mainstream projects, risking cannibalisation of existing and currently profitable
markets, for example, and the need to acquire different resources to those normally
available to the firm. 
Instead, alternative approaches outside the normal decision-making channels, may 
be needed to handle early stage thinking and exploring of opportunities, bring the
innovation back into the mainstream processes when the uncertainty level has 
been lowered. This may require the development of parallel structures within the
organisation or even setting up satellite ventures and organisations outside the normal
firm boundary.  
reframing and the innovation selection space
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9Twelve excuses for rejecting radical innovation projects
Organisations have no shortage of justifications for persisting with the old ways 
of doing things. Our research has identified no less than twelve ways in which
organisations attempt to rationalise the decision not to adopt a radical innovation.
Argument The established excuse Examples
‘It’s not our 
business’
Recognition of interesting new
business idea, but rejection as 
it lies too far from firm’s core
competence or current
business areas.
Encyclopedia Britannica failed 
to exploit technologies of
multimedia CDs and Internet,
losing its position as leading
information provider.
‘It’s not a 
business’
Evaluation suggests business plan
is flawed along key dimension –
often underestimating potential for
market development and growth.
Fred Smith had the idea for an
overnight delivery service while
studying at Yale. His business
professor, the United States Postal
Service, UPS, experts, all said it
would never work. Smith went on 
to found Federal Express.
‘It’s not big 
enough for us’
Emergent market size is too small
to meet growth targets of large
established firm.
Large and successful corporations
need big ideas to grow. At one
point Procter and Gamble needed
to create a business the size of a
Starbucks annually to meet growth
targets. As a result, interesting
new ideas are often dismissed 
as not big enough to help meet
ambitious growth targets. 
‘Not invented 
here’
Recognition but ultimate rejection
of interesting idea with potential –
often by finding flaws or mismatch
to current internal trajectories.
When Chester Carlson invented
photocopying in 1937, the likes of
General Electric, IBM, Kodak, and
RCA, said the idea had no merit.
Why buy an expensive copy
machine when carbon paper 
was so cheap, plentiful, and
convenient? Carlson set up his
own company – Xerox – to exploit
the idea. 
‘Invented here’ Recognition of interesting idea 
but rejection because internally
generated version is perceived 
to be superior.
When electronics giant RCA
developed a prototype portable
transistor-based radio in the 1950s
it saw little reason to promote
apparently inferior technology
continuing to develop and build its
high range devices.
Sony used the new technologies 
to gain access to the emerging
consumer market and build a whole
generation of portable consumer
devices – reshaping the market. 
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Argument The established excuse Examples
‘We’re not 
cannibals’
Recognition of potential for 
impact on current markets but
reluctance to adopt potentially
competing idea.
The shift from cross-ply to radial
tyres posed problems for existing
players because it challenged
them to cannibalise their existing
markets.
‘It ain’t broke 
so why fix it’
No perceived relative advantage 
in adopting new idea.
Slow adoption of new techniques
means newcomers are often able
to seize advantage, as happened
when solid state electronics
innovators took on the established
valve companies.
‘Great minds 
think alike’
‘Groupthink’ at strategic 
decision-making level – new idea
lies outside the collective frame 
of reference. 
Despite extensive board-level
discussion at Polaroid about how 
to react to digital imaging the
response crystallised around the
existing business model and
groupthink helped rationalise that
approach as the correct one.
‘(existing) 
customers
won’t/don’t 
want it’
New idea offers little to interest 
or attract current customers –
essentially a different value
proposition.
Disruptive innovation undoubtedly
led to the shake-up in the airline
industry with the shift towards
low-cost, no frills travel.
‘We’ve never 
done it before’
Perception that risks involved 
are too high along market and
technical dimensions.
When fast followers are too slow
they may end up so far behind the
learning curve they cannot recover.
Xerox was too slow reacting to the
small copier revolution initiated by
Japanese entrants to the market
who brought new technologies 
to copying.
‘We’re doing OK 
as we are ‘
The success trap – insufficient
motivation or organisational slack
to allow exploration outside
current lines.
It is difficult for incumbents to
switch from approaches that have
proved hugely successful up until
that point.
‘Let’s set up 
a pilot’
Recognition of new idea’s 
potential but limited, inadequate
commitment to exploring and
developing idea. 
Senior management sets up a
small team to develop ideas and
plans for dealing with radical
innovation, but backs off when
faced with suggestions that have
serious implications for the
organisation, operationally as well
as culturally.
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(2) In the zone
Organisations try to balance the exploiting innovation activities – do what we do
better – with more open-ended exploring innovation activities – doing something
different. Most organisations also have innovation boundaries; comfort zones that
define the limits to what is acceptable exploration, beyond which they are reluctant 
or unable to search.  
Decision-making around radical options becomes constrained, giving rise to innovation
anxiety and demands for thinking outside of the box. Higher levels of uncertainty put
pressure on innovation resource allocation decision-making models. Ideas that do not
fit neatly into the existing models are rejected, and over time a self-censoring element
to the process arises.
Figure 1.The innovation selection space
One way of looking at the innovation selection space is shown in figure 1. The vertical
axis refers to the familiar ‘incremental/radical’ dimension in innovation, whilst the
second relates to environmental complexity – the number of elements and their
potential interactions. 
Rising complexity means that it becomes increasingly difficult to predict a particular
state because of the increasing number of potential configurations of these elements.
It is here that problems of decision-making become significant because of very high
levels of uncertainty. 
The first two zones represent familiar territory in the innovation selection space. 
■ Zone 1
This is the exploit domain in innovation. It presumes a stable and shared frame, 
a business model architecture, within which adaptive and incremental development
takes place. Selection is associated with the steady state, and includes portfolio
methods, stage gate reviews, clear resource allocation criteria, project management
structures, and so on. The structures involved in this selection activity are clearly
defined with relevant actors, clear decision points, decision rules and criteria. 
Bounded exploration Co-evolve
Exploit Reframing
Radical
Innovation
Incremental
Established frame New frame
Environmental complexity
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is a bit more
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■ Zone 2
Zone 2 involves selection which is a bit more adventurous but still takes place within
the same basic mental frame – business model as usual.  
The bets may have longer odds but the decision-making is still carried out against an
underlying strategic model and sense of core competences. Debate and politicking
may take place about which choices to make, but there is an underlying framework 
to define the arena in which this takes place.  
The structures involved in such selection activity are, of necessity, focused at high
level key strategic commitments rather than tactical investments. These are big bets.
There are often tensions between the exploit and exploring views, and boardroom
battles between these two camps for resources are often tense.  
Since exploratory concepts carry high uncertainty the decision to proceed becomes
more of an act of faith than one matched by a clear, fact-based business case.
Consequently, emotional characteristics, such as passion and enthusiasm on the part
of the proposer – champion behaviour – or personal endorsement by a senior player –
sponsorship behaviour – play a more significant role in persuading decision-makers. 
■ Zone 3
This zone is associated with reframing. It involves searching and selecting from a
space where alternative architectures are generated, exploring different permutations
and combinations of elements in the environment.  
This process, essentially entrepreneurial, is risky and often results in failure but 
can also lead to the emergence of new and powerful alternative business models.
This often happens by working with elements in the environment not embraced by
established business models, and consequently poses problems for existing players.  
There is a strong reinforcing inertia about systems for search and selection. The value
networks take on the character of closed systems which operate as virtuous circles
and, for as long as they are perceived to create value through innovation, act as
inhibitors to reframing. After all, why change an apparently successful formula with
relatively clear information about innovation options and well-established routines 
for managing the process?  
The innovation in this space does not necessarily involve pushing technological
frontiers, but rather about working with new architectures – new ways for framing
what is already there.
The low cost airlines industry, for example, developed a new way of framing the
transportation business based on rethinking many of the elements – turnaround times
at airports, different plane designs, different internet based booking and pricing
models, etc. – and also working with different new elements – essentially addressing
markets like students and pensioners which had not been major elements in the
traditional business model. 
Innovation resource allocation approaches which work well for zones 1 and 2, do not
necessarily work well here. The innovations themselves may not be radical, but they
require consideration through a different lens and the kinds of information which are
involved, and the perceived significance of that information may be unfamiliar or hard
to obtain.  
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For example, in moving into new under-served markets the challenge is that traditional
market research and analysis techniques may be inappropriate for markets which
effectively do not yet exist.  
Many of the twelve justifications can be mapped on to difficulties in managing
selection in zone 3. For example, ‘it’s not our business’ relates to the lack of perceived
competence in analysis of new and unfamiliar variables. ‘Not invented here’ relates 
to similar lack of perceived experience, competence or involvement in a technological
field and the inability to analyse and take rational decisions about it. ‘It’s not a
business’ – relates to apparent market size which in initial stages may appear small
and unlikely to serve the growth needs of established incumbents. But such markets
could grow – the challenge is seeing an alternative trajectory to the current dominant
logic of the established business model. 
The challenge is detecting a possible new pattern and absorbing and integrating new
elements into it. This is hard to do because it requires reframing, and challenges the
existing system. Powerful social forces that militate towards conforming come into
play. Significantly, where there are examples of radical changes in mindset and
subsequent strategic direction, these often come about as a result of crisis, which
shatters the prevailing mindset, or with the arrival from outside of a new CEO with 
a different world view.
The challenge is detecting a possible new pattern and absorbing and
integrating new elements into it.
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where new-to-
the-world
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it is the edge 
of chaos, a
complex
environment... 
■ Zone 4
Zone 4 is where new-to-the-world innovation takes place; it is the edge of chaos, 
a complex environment where innovation emerges as a product of a process of 
co-evolution, and complex interactions between independent elements.
Processes of amplification and feedback reinforce what begin as small shifts in
direction and gradually define a trajectory. All bets are potentially options – and 
high variety experimentation takes place. Selection is a real problem since it is, by
definition, impossible to predict what is going to be important or where the initial
emergence will start and around which feedback and amplification will happen.  
This zone poses major challenges to established sets of selection routines, even 
if capable of dealing with known unknowns. Zone 4 is unknown unknowns territory.
Analytical tools and evidence-based decision-making, reviewing business cases, 
for example, are inappropriate for deciding on what moves to make in an innovation
game where the rules are unclear and the board on which it is played has yet to 
be designed.
A good example is the management of chronic diseases like diabetes in a future
where the incidence is likely to rise, the costs of treatment will rise faster than health
budgets can cope, and where many different stakeholders are involved – clinicians,
drug companies, insurance companies, carers and patients.
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Table 1: Selection challenges, tools and enabling structures 
Zone Selection challenges Tools and methods Enabling structures
1
‘Business as
usual’ – innovation
under steady state
conditions, little
disturbance around
core business
model.
Decisions taken on the basis
of exploiting existing and
understood knowledge and
deploying in known fields.
Incremental innovation aimed
at refining and improving.
Build strong ties and work
with key players in existing
value network. 
‘Good practice’ new
product/service development.
Portfolio methods and clear
decision criteria, stage gate
reviews along clear and
established pathways. 
Formal and mainstream
structures – established 
stage-gate process with 
defined review meetings. 
High involvement across
organisation roles and
functions in the decision-
making.
2
‘Business model 
as usual’ –
bounded
exploration 
within this frame. 
Exploration – pushing frontiers
of technology and market via
calculated risks – buying a
look at new options through
strategic investments in
further research. Involves 
risk-taking and high
uncertainty.
Advanced risk assessment
tools – e.g. R&D options and
futures. Multiple portfolio
methods and ‘fuzzy front end’
toolkit – bubble charts, etc.
Criteria used are a mix of
financial and non-financial.
Judgmental methods allow
for some influence of passion
and enthusiasm.
May form part of existing
stage gate and review
system with extra attention
devoted to higher risk
projects at early stages.
May also involve special
meetings outside that
frame – decision-making at
strategic (board) level rather
than operational.
3
Alternative frame
– taking in
new/different
elements in
environment. 
Reframe – explore alternative
options, introduce new
elements. Challenge involves
decision-making under
uncertainty, but not simply a
problem of lack of information
and the need to take risky bets
to learn more. There is also the
issue of unfamiliar frames of
reference and the difficulty of
letting go of a dominant logic.
Cognitive dissonance means
that incumbents have trouble
forgetting enough to see the
environment through new
eyes.
May use variations of 
existing toolkit – e.g. 
portfolio methods, but 
extend parameters: fuzzy
front end, bubble charts, etc;
alternative futures and
visioning tools; constructed
crisis; prototyping – probe
and learn; creativity
techniques; use of internal
and external entrepreneurs
decentralising development
of early business case;
alternative funding models
and decentralised authority
for early stage exploration.
Unlikely to fit with
established decision
structures – stage gate 
and portfolio – since these
are designed around
established business 
model frame. Needs parallel
or alternative evaluation
structures – at least for
early stage.   
4 Radical 
– new to the world
– possibilities. 
New architecture
around as yet
unknown and
established
elements.
Emergence – need to co-
evolve with stakeholders
■ Be in there
■ Be in there early
■ Be in there actively.
Complexity theory – feedback
and amplification, probe and
learn, prototyping and use of
boundary objects.  
Far from mainstream:
satellite structures – skunk
works or even outside the
firm; licensed dreamers;
outside agents and
facilitators.
Table 1 below summarises the challenges posed across our selection space and
highlights the need to experiment with new approaches for selection in zones 3 and 4.
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managing the innovation selection process
(1) Tools to help 
Faced with the reframing and high uncertainty challenges of zones 3 and 4, how can
organisations manage the selection process? We’ve seen that established methods
like stage gates, business cases, portfolio tools etc, start to break down under these
conditions – so what else can they use? Research and experience-sharing within the
AIM Discontinuous Innovation Laboratory suggests a number of promising lines for
development, including:
■ Building alternative visions;
■ Bridge-building to/from outside the box;
■ Probe and learn methods;
■ Using alternative evaluation and measurement criteria;
■ Mobilising sponsorship and championship;
■ Using alternative decision-making pathways;
■ Deploying alternative funding structures;
■ Using alternative – dedicated/devolved/decentralised – implementation structures;
■ Mobilising entrepreneurship inside and outside the firm.
a) Building alternative futures
Firms should look at alternative mental models, consider different approaches and
attempt to assess their relevance and salience for their business strategies – as an
insurance policy if nothing else.  
Here the area of futures studies is useful, using tools such as forecasting, trend
extrapolation and scenario building to create and explore alternative models of the
future and the potential threats and opportunities which they contain. This develops
flexibility in framing, helping build a tolerance for ambiguity within the decision-
making structures of the organisation.
Increasingly futures tools are being deployed in frameworks designed to open up 
new innovation space. The Gamechanger programme, for example, has been used in
organisations such as Shell and Whirlpool. Many other companies, including BMW,
Novozymes and Nokia, use similar approaches, deploying a range of techniques
including metaphors, storytelling and vision-building, increasingly in a cross-sectoral
fashion, recognising that the future may involve blurring of traditional market or
demographic boundaries.
The electrical engineering and electronics firm Siemens uses storytelling, identifying
trends of the future (like mega cities) and using these as the basis for storytelling
about the importance of selecting discontinuous ideas to deal with the future
challenges that go hand in hand with these trends. 
Increasingly
futures tools are
being deployed
in frameworks
designed to
open up new
innovation
space.
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Organisations can use a ‘constructed crisis’ technique, where the firm deliberately
explores radical and challenging futures to create a sense of unease, a platform from
which to develop new directions forward. Or another strategy is to use outsiders, such as
consultants, to provoke and challenge the status quo by questioning existing assumptions
and presenting radically different views to the collective wisdom of those in charge. The
challenging can also come from inside the organisation. Intel, for example, which by
fostering a process called ‘constructive confrontation’ encourages a degree of dissent.  
Strong leadership can be critical to carrying the company forward into new territory,
especially when the orthodoxy is being challenged. 
b) Prototyping as a way of building bridges in the selection process
Radical innovation is essentially a leap into the unknown and part of the problem is that we
don’t have anything against which to compare it. Short on facts and relying on imagination
and guesswork it should be no surprise that there is often a tendency to play safe –
especially if the imagined picture of the innovation looks like nothing ever seen before.
When entrepreneurs see something new, in order to take that forward and make the
idea a reality, they face the challenge of mobilising resources and convincing people of 
an innovation’s potential without any supporting evidence. 
In these cases a useful strategy is to attempt to build bridges in the minds of potential
supporters between the current state of affairs and what might be. Building bridges
involves finding stepping stones between the two situations, and one way of achieving
this is to use prototyping, creating stepping stones that allow people to better
understand and shape the idea when it is still in its formative stages. 
Prototyping includes physical models, simulation, and many other forms, spanning both
manufactured products and service concepts. The process can also involve outsourcing
the exploration to consultants that act in a bridging fashion, reducing the risk to the
organisation. By employing consultants like IDEO or ?What if! organisations can conduct
safe experiments and then develop and work with the emerging prototype.
Prototyping plays an important role in highly complex environments (zone 4) where there
is no clear direction and where processes of co-evolution are involved. Under these
conditions tools like feedback and amplification around key points are important. Arguably
prototypes provide the boundary objects to enable this to happen. For example, in the 
UK the NHS have been working with a team from the Design Council on prototypes for
radical new approaches to diabetes care – recognising that this is huge and growing
problem that will require very different approaches to its management in the future. 
(see www.designcouncil.info/RED/health for more).
Matthias Gold, Senior Manager of Egozentrik – a German start-up company that
designs hybrid bikes – reports that they developed around 40 prototypes over a five
years period to collect information about the unknown territory of hybrid bikes and to
learn from the feedback gained. 
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c) Probe and learn
A big part of the problem when making selection decisions about radical innovation ideas
is the scale of uncertainty. Given the choice, organisations opt for more certain over less
certain, a tendency that militates against more radical innovation.
One way of dealing with the uncertainty problem is to use ‘probe and learn’ approaches,
taking small steps into the unknown. The idea is to facilitate a move to a new place
outside the comfort zone through a series of planned experiments. These serve two
functions – they provide new information about what does and doesn’t work and so help
build the case for selection. But they also represent ways of mapping unsafe territory 
and reducing the emotional anxiety. In this sense they are investments in what has been
called ‘buying a look’ – and they help assemble the beginnings of a case for further
support and exploration. 
Probe and learn stages the risk attached to selection decision-making into smaller steps,
rather than forcing a once and for all commitment. Investments in buying a look may help
point in new and exciting directions justifying the investment – or they may fail, revealing
that it is the wrong direction to head in.
Increasingly, smart organisations are using probe and learn approaches as a deliberate
strategy to explore and take options on uncertain but interesting future directions. 
So, rather than confirming and shaping existing ideas, prototyping becomes a planned
experiment to test a hypothesis, where failure of the experiment is worth as much as
success in terms of learning about the directions not to travel in.
Collecting data from extreme environments and fringe users becomes useful for getting
early warning about possible weak signals for change, and learning how to work under
these very different conditions. There are plenty of methods to choose from but they all
share the characteristic of being deliberate experiments in the unknown.
BBC Backstage tries to do with new media development what the open source
community did with software development. The model is deceptively simple –
developers are invited to make free use of various elements of the BBC’s site, such 
as live news feeds, weather, TV listings and so on, to integrate and shape innovative
applications. The strap line is ‘use our stuff to build your stuff.’
Ben Metcalf, one of the programme’s founders, summed up the approach. 
“Top line, we are looking to be seen promoting innovation and creativity on the
Internet ... if someone is doing something really innovative, we would like to ... see if
some of that value can be incorporated into the BBC’s core propositions.” The process
is linked to Innovation Labs – essentially a short-term incubator run at various regional
locations where promising ideas can be worked up jointly by BBC staff and developer
before being pitched to senior managers for possible adoption.
d) Using alternative measurement and evaluation criteria
Selection systems require decision-making criteria, and a general acceptance of 
these criteria as a good basis on which to take decisions. The high uncertainty
associated with radical innovation makes this problematic. As a result, a compromise
is often reached whereby existing systems are adapted; a solution that may be only
partially effective. 
For example, Reckitt Benckiser employs conventional criteria but increases the hurdle
rate in order to mitigate the risk associated with uncertainty. Kodak relaxes
conventional criteria recognising that discontinuous innovation needs room for
moulding and maturing. Unilever applies broad boundaries – maximum permissible
losses – within which discontinuous innovation can be nurtured.
Elsewhere, organisations are experimenting with deploying alternative criteria within
their decision systems, using approaches like discovery-driven planning where higher
uncertainty is involved along technical, market or other dimensions. The idea here is
that, instead of using stage gates when a simple ‘pass/fail’ decision is made, learning
loops are used where at each loop there is a discussion about what is known and
what needs to be explored further – where to target the next stage of learning. 
These models link to resource allocation in the same way as stage gates but have 
the advantage of allowing further exploration to proceed.
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e) Mobilising networks of support
People with radical ideas need a great deal of personal energy, enthusiasm and
passion to move their ideas forward, and get them beyond the organisation’s comfort
zone. Help from other people can also be very useful; especially if those people
happen to be powerful sponsors at high levels who can help promote their cause or
ease some of the tensions it sets up. 
Champions of radical innovation fulfil a number of different roles, including: technical
champions, project champions, senior management champions and business unit
champions. These roles may be combined in a single individual, such as James Dyson
of Dyson vacuum cleaner fame, or be divided among several people in a team or
tandem arrangement, as with Art Fry and Spence Silver at the multinational
conglomerate 3M.
The challenge lies in building champions into the decision-making process, rather 
than hoping that they will emerge. One approach is to make formal links with senior
managers who are then tasked with becoming a sponsor for discontinuous innovation
projects. Another approach is to identify and use highly technically adept individuals
with a high profile reputation.
For example, one basic element of British Telecoms’ Wakaba programme (Japanese
for ‘green shoots’), designed to support innovative ideas within the company, is the
creation of partnerships. Each project has a senior management mentor associated
with it. Every eight weeks on-going innovation projects are reviewed by a jury of top
executives. The mentors represented at these sessions provide advice and guidance
to help shape and take ideas forward. This process ensures that top management is
both aware and involved in the innovation activities.
Some organisations, such as Cancer Research for example, may co-opt outsiders 
to help with the innovation process, to bring in different perspectives and provide
support and championship for interesting ideas.
In their work on radical innovation in the USA, academics Gina Colarelli O’Connor 
and Robert Veryzer observed three distinct roles of individuals that help formulate,
articulate, sustain and implement DI opportunities:
■ Ruminators – are contemplative, experienced and progressive people, with 
the ability to bring together disparate information by looking far beyond their 
own business boundaries. This role is key to the search phase.
■ Champions – promote the opportunity identified by the ruminator. They are
entrepreneurial in obtaining the necessary resources and effective at selling 
or justifying the vision. This role is key to idea selection.
■ Implementers – are often volunteers who enjoy working on more risky projects,
particularly if they feel they have an opportunity of working on technology that 
may change the world. These people are key to implementation.
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f) Using alternative decision-making pathways
Smart organisations have systems in place to review the progress of innovation
projects from idea to implementation. These systems often take the form of an
innovation funnel: a sieve at the front to select and build a balanced portfolio of
projects which match business needs and then a series of stage gates to review
progress against increasingly tight criteria and objectives.
Radical innovation is less amenable to the mainstream funnel approach. That is
because the mainstream systems are designed to manage risk and enable decision
based on market and technological facts that are marshalled into a clear business
case. Ideas which are vague, hazy, speculative and lacking a clear business case –
radical innovation – are thrown out.
The inability of conventional funnel systems to cope with more risky innovation has
led some organisations to create alternative pathways for developing radical ideas, 
at least to the stage where they can stand up for themselves in the mainstream
innovation funnel process.
These parallel or alternative structures for radical innovation vary in shape and form
but essentially have a ‘fuzzy’ front end which allows for building a potential portfolio 
of higher risk ideas and options, plus some additional mechanisms for gradually
building a business case which can be subjected to increasingly critical criteria for
resource allocation. 
These systems may well rejoin the mainstream funnel at a later stage, or they 
may continue to operate in parallel – see figure 2. And they may lead to a range of
options other than progression as a mainstream project – spin off, license out, buy in,
for example.
Smart
organisations
have systems in
place to review
the progress of
innovation
projects from
idea to
implementation.
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Another interesting development is the use of internal markets to assess ideas. The key
is to open the evaluation to a broader set of people, and get an aggregation of opinions.
Some companies, for example, are experimenting with virtual stock market models. 
A group of people are able to trade virtual shares of new product ideas on a virtual stock
market. Virtual shares can represent multiple future events – the specific sales of a new
product at a determined timeslot, for example. The value of the shares depends on the
realisation of the market situation.
This tool falls somewhere between evaluation by experts and consumer research. 
Not only can an organisation gain market insights, it can also track down people 
with a specific talent in forecasting future sales, identifying them by the value of their
virtual portfolio. 
Another approach is to use open evaluation platforms which enable all or some
individuals within the business to evaluate a product quantitatively or qualitatively 
and to make suggestions about how to take the idea further.
The Ordnance Survey mapping organisation in the UK uses a model based on the
popular BBC TV series, Dragon’s Den:
■ A panel of senior executives periodically get together to assess competitive
funding bids for both conventional and discontinuous projects. 
■ Ideas generated by employees are initially assessed against predefined criteria 
by ‘innovation angels’ who then select and refine projects for presentation. 
■ The idea is then pitched to the members of the Dragons Den which decide 
on whether to support it with ring fenced funds. 
■ Not only are the projects selected using a forum that bypasses the corporate immune
system but they also gather considerable executive support from the outset. 
The communications company O2 adopts a more informal approach, using
Presentation Rounds. These are early stage forums in which both conventional and
discontinuous ideas can be pitched to senior staff. No formal screening criteria are
applied and the competition is not to win funding. Successful projects gain the
interest and support of the senior staff and are allocated a champion, who acts as a
sponsor and advocate, to help take the idea further and assist in securing resources.
Both methods require either discretionary or dedicated developmental resources,
which are separate from the traditional R&D or Innovation budgets.
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Swedish paper products company SCA has developed a system that not only aims 
to manage normal and radical innovation via different routes, but attempts to capture
and retain ideas which, while not finding immediate application, might prove useful in
the future.
Central to the system is distinguishing between ‘inside the box’ and ‘outside the box’
innovation ideas. 
■ ‘Inside the box’ ideas are defined as incremental technological innovations with
little market novelty and initiatives which are within the current competence area
of the firm. 
■ Those ideas which are completely new for the firm, in either the technological 
or business dimension, are defined as ‘outside the box’ initiatives. 
When an idea is submitted it is classified as either ‘inside the box’ or ‘outside the box’
and then takes a different path depending on its nature. 
‘Inside the box’ ideas go either to the patent department for further investigation, or 
to the market organisation. Those ideas are treated like other project initiatives within
the firm. 
‘Outside the box’ ideas go to a recently started unit called New Business
Development (NBD) which lies outside the rest of the organisation and aims to
evaluate, incubate and develop those ideas. Here, the evaluation process differs from
the assessment of incremental innovations. The criteria are less rigid; rather than
evaluating an idea according to the current capabilities of the firm, the initial screening
attempts to define gaps in capabilities, and find ways to solve the potential problems
associated with those gaps. 
Moreover, instead of evaluating ideas according to their risks, an iterative approach is
employed aiming to identify and reduce risks. When these ideas have been developed
further they are either handed over to the main organisation of the firm or launched as
independent ventures.
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g) Deploying alternative funding structures
Resources are essential to allow further exploration of technical or market options, 
to develop and test ideas, to commit to full-scale preparation and launch, and to
support innovations in the long term as they mature and continuously improve. 
But how should you allocate resources? 
Not surprisingly, smart organisations have developed sophisticated alternative 
and parallel funding arrangements which provide access to funding on a range 
of different terms.
Figure 2: Funding alternatives
Figure 2 shows a range of funding alternatives. One axis details the amount of
funding, from small development increments to full scale big bets. The other axis 
is the extent to which this is internal funding as opposed to external.
A significant number of organisations tap special dedicated or discretionary budgets
to finance radical innovation projects. Using a special funding approach provides
access to a more reliable funding stream for those people working on the project. 
In many cases such projects also have a top level champion who can sometimes
provide additional access to resources. 
Partnering also brings in resources, but with a different perspective – that of an external
organisation. It enables financial risk to be shared and ensures that an incubating
discontinuous innovation is given appropriate focus, not left on the back-burner. 
Many organisations develop a parallel structure or track for ideas which lie outside the
mainstream by setting up some kind of dual structure, whether it is called a special
project team, incubator, new venture division, corporate venture unit or skunk works.
Some have a more formal status than others; some have more direct power or
resources; others are dependent on internal sponsors or patrons.
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The purpose of the dual structure is to protect new and often high-risk ideas from 
the mainstream organisation until they have achieved some measure of commercial
viability. Such units, though, are hard to manage effectively. Research suggests that
they work best when they have CEO-level support, clear objectives, and their own
separate sources of finance. They work least well when parent company managers
meddle in the evaluation and selection of ventures, and when they are expected to
support multiple, changing objectives. 
Another issue with dual structures is the need to bring the idea back into the
mainstream at some point. Dual structures are useful vehicles for growing ideas 
to the point where they can be more fairly evaluated against mainstream criteria 
and portfolio selection systems, but they need to be seen as temporary rather 
than permanent mechanisms. Otherwise there is a risk of separation and, at the 
limit, a loss of leverage against the knowledge and other assets of the mainstream
organisation.
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h) Using alternative, dedicated implementation structures
One problem with making decisions about resource allocation for discontinuous
innovation projects is that the ideas are not well developed when they first come 
up for consideration. 
A strategy for dealing with this is to make use of different mechanisms for incubation
and early stage development elsewhere – off-line or at least away from the harsh
environment of the normal resource allocation system.
Another approach is to use third party consultants as a short-term environment 
in which more radical ideas can be developed and explored. IDEO and others have 
been playing this role on behalf of several firms; the consultancy firm ?What if! now
has its own venture arm in which it takes stakes in radical ideas which emerge from
its consulting activity.
In many cases the venturing and the dedicated funding themes are linked in some
form of new venture fund. At Unilever Ventures, for example, the firm’s quasi-
autonomous division is responsible for assessing, selecting, and investing in
discontinuous innovation opportunities originating from within and outside Unilever. 
With a budget of $250m it is essentially a corporate venture fund that co-invests in
businesses outside the usual scope of Unilever operations. It has an exit horizon of
five years and, beyond not losing more than $50m a year, is relatively unconstrained. 
Unilever’s approach is also ideally suited to engaging in partnerships. These confer 
a host of benefits including risk sharing, a higher probability of project success
through shared skills and experience, and a greater level of commitment than found 
in solo ventures. 
Furthermore the reduction in risk and uncertainty associated with effective
partnerships may lead to a broader range of discontinuous innovation being
considered and selected. At the end of the five-year investment cycle the mature
businesses will either need to be sold off or bought out entirely and incorporated 
into Unilever’s corporate structure.
Coloplast, the Danish medical devices firm, established a small group, Nebula – New
Business Lab, with the remit to explore and bring back new options in an attempt to
open up new market and technology space and move beyond its existing product
range. Those options could include acquisitions, licences for new technologies, new
alliances and partnerships or established product ideas. The group also looked at
licensing and spinning out. 
Some organisations set up external ventures where such incubation can take place.
Siemens makes use of satellite SMEs in which it has a share to act as incubator
environments to take forward some of its more radical ideas. Others take stakes in
start-ups to explore and develop ideas to the point where they might represent formal
options for full acquisition – or spin out.
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It must be noted, however, that although they are effective vehicles for identifying 
and exploring radical innovation, the operational, organisational and strategic
disconnect between such venture works and their projects and the corporation raises
some serious issues, not least being the feasibility of assimilating a mature but
discontinuous business into the parent company. 
i) Mobilising entrepreneurship
Entrepreneurship is at the heart of the discontinuous innovation challenge – seeing
opportunities and making them happen in the form of radical innovation. It makes
sense, therefore, to explore options that help the process forward, and build on the
core principles of entrepreneurship – like being able to pitch an idea with passion and
enthusiasm, as well as a good story. 
One strategy is to try to identify and work with entrepreneurs inside and outside 
the organisation and allow their natural capabilities to help select and implement
discontinuous innovation ideas. This freedom is at the heart of many famous
programmes such as 3M’s intrapreneuring, or more recently, the ‘free’ time allocated
to Google’s engineers to explore new ideas of their own. 
Procter and Gamble takes its open innovation model forward partly through the use 
of technology entrepreneurs who identify new ideas and help to promote and sell
them internally, for example. 
SAP, the business software solutions firm, set up a venture unit called SAP Inspire to
fund startups with interesting technologies. The mission of the group is to ‘be a world-
class corporate venturing group that will contribute, through business and technical
innovation, to SAP’s long-term growth and leadership.’ It does this in several ways
including:
■ seeking entrepreneurial talent within SAP and providing an environment where ideas
are evaluated on an open and objective basis; 
■ actively soliciting and cultivating ideas from the SAP community as well as
effectively managing the innovation process from idea generation to
commercialisation; 
■ looking for growth opportunities that are beyond the existing portfolio but within
SAP’s overall vision and strategy.
Biotech firm Novozymes is building an internal network of entrepreneurs. Besides
identifying internal people it also recruits people with entrepreneurial spirit from the
outside – often people who had built up their own businesses. While aware that these
people may be very different from existing employees and want to leave after a short
period of time, it decided that even a couple of years would be enough time to
provide inspiration and learning. 
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A number of organisations are trying to make explicit use of the entrepreneurial
approach to help with the other stages of the discontinuous innovation challenge –
search, select and implement. Creating the culture to enable this is not easy, it
requires a commitment of resources, and also a set of mechanisms to take bright
ideas forward, including various internal development grants and often complicated
and fickle internal funding processes. 
Many such schemes include a strong incentive scheme for those willing to take a 
lead in taking ideas into marketable products at their core. An additional incentive is
often the opportunity to not only lead the development of the new idea, but also get
involved in the running of the new business.
Fostering a bootlegging culture – encouraging people to try things out without
necessarily asking for permission or establishing a formal project – can also be a
productive way of nurturing more radical ideas. It allows strong ideas to surface
through the energy of entrepreneurs, in spite of apparent rules and constraints. 
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Innovation strategy is far from being an exact science. The process of choosing 
where to place scarce resources when the outcomes of the projects to be backed 
are unknown has a lot in common with betting at the racetrack – but without the
benefit of the initial betting odds to provide a guide to prospective success.
Over time, however, smart organisations develop systems to help them with the
uncertainty attached to discontinuous innovation – using frameworks and techniques
which help them convert raw uncertainty into a degree of calculated risk, and then to
spread this risk across a portfolio of projects. To return to the betting metaphor, they
find ways of arriving at some betting odds for their radical innovation projects, and
then continue to adjust those odds over time as the projects progress.
Increasingly, radical innovation – do something very different – rather than incremental,
steady state innovation – doing what we do but better – is what provides competitive
advantage and industry beating performance. To do radical innovation well means that
organisations have to develop parallel and workable systems to provide an effective
approach to managing highly uncertain innovation outcomes. 
While the perfect system for detecting, nurturing, developing and exploiting radical
innovation has yet to be created, our research shows that there is lot firms can do to
increase their prospects of success – it is no longer a question of a sticking a few
pins on a list of projects and hoping for the best.
conclusion
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